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Abstract. Since being officially selected as the new Advanced Encryp-
tion Standard (AES), Rijndael has continued to receive great attention
and has had its security continuously evaluated by the cryptographic
community.
Rijndael is a cipher with a simple, elegant and highly algebraic structure.
Its selection as the AES has led to a growing interest in the study of alge-
braic properties of block ciphers, and in particular algebraic techniques
that can be used in their cryptanalysis.
In these notes we will examine some algebraic aspects of the AES and
consider a number of algebraic techniques that could be used in the
analysis of the cipher. In particular, we will focus on the large, though
surprisingly simple, systems of multivariate quadratic equations derived
from the encryption operation, and consider some approaches that could
be used when attempting to solve these systems.
These notes refer to an invited talk given at the Fourth Conference on
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES4) in May 2004, and are largely
based on [4].
1 Introduction
Rijndael is a block-cipher with a simple and elegant structure. It has been de-
signed to offer strong resistance against known attacks, in particular differential
and linear cryptanalysis, while enabling efficient implementation on different
platforms. Given its careful design criteria, it seems unlikely that its security
can be affected by conventional methods of cryptanalysis.
Rijndael has also a highly algebraic structure: the cipher round transforma-
tions are based on simple operations over the finite field F28 . Its selection as the
AES has therefore led to a growing interest in the study of algebraic proper-
ties of block ciphers, as well as algebraic techniques that can be used in their
cryptanalysis [1, 2, 6, 12, 13].
This new approach in cryptanalysis seems promising. One reason is that con-
ventional methods of cryptanalysis of block-ciphers (e.g. differential and linear
cryptanalysis) are generally based on a “statistical” approach: the attacker at-
tempts to construct probabilistic characteristics through as many rounds of the
cipher as possible, in order to distinguish the cipher from a random permuta-
tion. Most modern ciphers have been designed with these attacks in mind, and
therefore do not generally have their security affected by them.
In contrast, the so-called algebraic attacks exploit the intrinsic algebraic
structure of a cipher: the attacker expresses the encryption transformation as
a (large) set of multivariate polynomial equations, and subsequently attempts
to solve such a system to recover the encryption key. Algebraic attacks could
open new perspectives in the cryptanalysis of block ciphers.
In these notes we will examine some algebraic aspects of the AES and consider
a number of algebraic techniques that could be used in the analysis of the cipher.
2 The Basic Structure of the AES
Rijndael is a key-iterated block cipher, which alternates key-independent round
transformations and key addition. In the basic version (considered here), the
cipher encrypts 128-bit blocks in 10 rounds, using 128-bit keys. We refer to [9]
for a full description of the cipher.
In these notes we will also consider the Big Encryption System (BES), an-
other iterated block cipher which was introduced in [13]. BES operates on 128-
byte blocks with 128-byte keys, and has also a very simple algebraic structure:
one round of the cipher consists of inversion, matrix multiplication and key ad-
dition, all operations over F28 .We refer to [13] for the full description of the BES
cipher.
Both the AES and the BES use a state vector of bytes, which is transformed
by the basic operations within a round. Furthermore, it is shown in [13] that one
can embed the AES into the BES, and that way obtain an alternative description
of the AES. This relationship between both ciphers may well provide new ways
for the cryptanalysis of the AES.
3 Algebraic Analysis of the AES
Due to the rich algebraic structure of the AES, there is currently a growing
interest in the study of algebraic techniques which could be applied in its crypt-
analysis. These are known as algebraic attacks. Currently there appears to be
two main approaches:
– Study the system of polynomial equations derived from the cipher;
– Study the AES underlying algebraic structure.
4 Algebraic Attacks
Unlike most conventional methods of cryptanalysis, the so-called algebraic at-
tacks attempt to exploit the intrinsic algebraic structure of the cipher. More
specifically, the attacker expresses the encryption transformation as a set of
multivariate polynomial equations and tries to recover the encryption key by
solving the system.
While in theory most modern block ciphers can be fully described by a sys-
tem of multivariate polynomial equations over a finite field, for the majority of
the cases such systems prove to be just too complex for any practical purpose.
However, given its algebraic structure, it seems that the AES could be more
vulnerable to such approach.
In [6] Courtois and Pieprzyk exhibit a large, sparse and overdefined system of
multivariate quadratic equations over F2 whose solution would recover the AES
encryption key. In the same paper they propose a method called XSL (eXtended
Sparse Linearization), as an attempt to efficiently solve the system. Around the
same time, Murphy and Robshaw [13] showed how to express the AES encryption
as a far simpler system of equations over F28 , which is derived from the BES.
If XSL or some of its variants are in fact valid methods, this system should be
faster to solve than the original one over F2, and in theory, could provide an
efficient key-recovery attack.
5 Potential Attack Techniques
Given the AES and BES algebraic formulations, it is clear that an efficient
method for the solution of this type of system of multivariate quadratic equa-
tions would provide a key-recovery attack of the AES with potentially very few
plaintext-ciphertext pairs. While the problem of solving generic large systems of
multivariate equations of degree greater than one over a finite field is known to
be NP-complete, it is conceivable that a technique can be developed which ex-
ploits the particular algebraic structure of the AES and BES systems. Below we
investigate a few approaches which have been proposed for solving such systems.
6 Linearization Methods
The method of linearization is a well-known technique for solving large systems
of multivariate polynomial equations. In this method one considers all monomi-
als in the system as independent variables and tries to solve the system using
linear algebra techniques. In order to apply the method, the number of linearly
independent equations in the system needs to be approximately the same as the
number of terms in the system. When this is not the case, a number of techniques
have been proposed to generate enough LI equations.
6.1 XL Algorithm
In [5] an algorithm for solving systems of multivariate quadratic equations called
XL (standing for eXtended Linearization) is proposed. XL is a simple algorithm:
if A is a system of m quadratic equations fi in n variables over a field K, and
D ∈ N, one executes the following steps:
1. Multiply: Generate all the products
∏k
j=1 xij ∗ fi with k ≤ D − 2;
2. Linearize: Consider each monomial of degree ≤ D as a new variable and
perform Gaussian elimination on the system obtained in step 1;
3. Solve: Assume that step 2 yields at least one univariate equation. Solve this
equation;
4. Repeat: Simplify the equations and repeat the process to find the values of
the other variables.
The hope is that after few iterations the algorithm will yield a solution for the
system.
In [5] the authors present some estimates for the complexity of the algorithm
for random systems with m ≈ n. In particular, they provide evidence that XL
can solve randomly generated overdefined systems of polynomial equations in
subexponential time.
The XL algorithm (as in the form above) is a reasonably new idea, and its
behaviour is not entirely understood yet. When analysing the algorithm, one
must examine two key points:
1. Does the algorithm always terminate?
2. Does the algorithm work as predicted?
Does XL always terminate? By applying well-known commutative algebra
techniques (Hilbert Theory), one can show that there are cases for which the
algorithm does not terminate [10]. However, when working over finite fields, this
problem can be avoided by adding to the system the underlying field equations
xqi − xi = 0 .
Does XL work as predicted? Initially it was suggested that XL could solve
systems of polynomial equations in subexponential time when the number of
equations exceeded the number of variables by a small number. However there
has been strong evidence that some of the heuristics used in the original article
were too optimistic [3, 10].
This discrepancy arises from the fact that one may often overestimate the
number of linearly independent equations generated by the algorithm. There
has been recently few papers studying the XL [3, 10], and one could say that the
algorithm has just started to be better understood now.
In any case, it is widely agreed that application of the XL algorithm against
the polynomial system which arises from the AES (either over F28 or F2) does
not provide an efficient attack against the cipher.
6.2 Variants of XL
Since the introduction of the XL method, a number of variants have been pro-
posed. These attempt to exploit specific properties of the polynomial systems,
such as how overdefined the system is, the order of the field, etc. Of particular
relevance for the AES is the method proposed in [6] by Courtois and Pieprzyk.
XSL is based on the XL method, but uses the sparsity and specific structure
of the equations to mount the attack; instead of multiplying the equations by
all monomials up to certain degree, in the XSL algorithm the equations are
multiplied only by “carefully selected monomials” (we refer to [6] and its earlier
version [7] for a full description of the method). While this has the intention to
create less new terms when generating new equations, it is not entirely clear the
exact criteria used for selecting the monomials.
The system used in [6] to mount the attack has 8000 quadratic equations
and 1600 variables, over F2 (the variables represent the input/output bits). Two
attacks are described in [7]: the first one ignores the key schedule and therefore
needs 11 known plaintext/ciphertext pairs (for the AES-128); the second attack
uses the key schedule, and in theory could be mounted with a single known
plaintext/ciphertext pair. In [6] it is claimed that the second XSL attack would
have complexity of ≈ 2230 and ≈ 2255 when applied against the 128-bit and
256-bit AES, respectively. So the XSL attack would represent a (theoretical)
successful key-recovery attack against the 256-bit AES.
XSL Attack on the BES. As said earlier, the F28 -system derived from the
BES is much simpler than the F2-system presented in [6]. In particular, it is far
sparser. This would strongly suggest that the XSL attack is more suited to the
BES system than to the original AES system.
Murphy and Robshaw consider in [13, 14] the consequences of the XSL attack
against the BES. Using the estimates given in [6], they conclude that if XSL is in
fact a valid technique, a key-recovery attack against the AES might be possible
with a work effort of about 2100 encryptions. This would clearly represent a
successful attack against the AES-128.
Accuracy of the XSL Estimates. The XSL algorithm consists basically of
two main steps:
1. The equation generation procedure;
2. The T ′ method at the end of the algorithm.
The first step corresponds to the multiplication of the initial set of equations
by selected monomials. This is done in similar manner of the XL algorithm.
The T ′ method is used at the end, and in theory would allow the method to
effectively solve the system even when the difference between the total number
of terms and the number of linearly independent equations is reasonably large.
The main issue when considering XSL attacks (in fact, all the XL-based
attacks) against the AES is how accurate the estimates for the number of linearly
independent equations are. As explained above, there is evidence that some of
the heuristics in the original XL paper were too optimistic. In fact, there is even
more concern when considering the XSL algorithm. Additionally, it is not clear
how effective the T ′ method is as a last step of the algorithm. The algorithm is
an ad-hoc method, based on a number of heuristics arguments, and although this
might not invalidate the XSL technique entirely, it makes it harder to formally
examine the algorithm and consider whether the XSL attacks described in [6]
work as claimed.
In fact, we have considered very small versions of BES, with reduced block
length and number of rounds, and smaller field. We ran a few simulations with
these versions, and it appears that the attacks do not work in the manner pre-
dicted in [6]. Again, while this might not invalidate the XSL technique, it could
raise doubts on whether the method is generally applicable against the AES and
BES systems. It is clear that more research is needed to determine how effective
this technique is against the AES.
7 Computational Algebra Techniques
Solving multivariate polynomial systems is a typical problem studied in Alge-
braic Geometry and Commutative Algebra. The classical algorithm for solving
this type of problem is the Buchberger algorithm for calculating Gro¨bner Bases
(see [8] for definitions and description of the algorithm). The algorithm generates
a basis for the ideal derived from the set of equations, which can then be used
to obtain the solutions.
The complexity of most algorithms used for calculating a Gro¨bner basis of an
ideal is closely related to the total degree of the intermediate polynomials that
are generated during the running of algorithm. In the worst case the Buchberger
algorithm is known to run in double exponential time. One of the most efficient
algorithms known, due to Fauge`re [11], appears to be single exponential. In any
case, in practice it is widely believed that Gro¨bner Bases algorithms cannot be
used for efficiently solving generic systems with more than a handful of variables.
However, the type of systems which arise from cryptosystems are often very
structured. In particular, the BES system has a very regular structure. This is
given for j = 0, . . . , 15 and m = 0, . . . , 7 by:
0 = w0,(j,m) + p(j,m) + k0,(j,m),
0 = xi,(j,m)wi,(j,m) + 1 for i = 0, . . . , 9,
0 = wi,(j,m) + ki,(j,m) +
∑
(j′,m′) α(j,m),(j′,m′)xi−1,(j′,m′) for i = 1, . . . , 9,
0 = c(j,m) + k10,(j,m) +
∑
(j′,m′) β(j,m),(j′,m′)x9,(j′,m′).
This system could be viewed as an “iterated” system of equations, with blocks
of similar “sub-systems” repeated for every round. One could also use the trans-
formation x 7→ x254 as the S-Box inversion to eliminate a number of variables
(the BES system considered above has the simplest form, with only quadratic
and linear equations).
Furthermore, since the system includes the equations relating every variable
with its conjugates, we have the following easy proposition:
Proposition 1. The degree of polynomials occurring in the computation of a
Gro¨bner basis of a BES-type system with n variables is at most n.
This is clearly an upper bound, and we expect that in practice the degrees are
much lower. This fact, together with the particular structure of the system, can
be exploited to infer more precise bounds for the complexity of the attack.
One can also seek alternatives for the use of the usual Gro¨bner bases al-
gorithm. There are also a number of common techniques used in cryptanalysis
that could be used in conjunction with computer algebra methods . For example,
one could attempt to adapt the meet-in-the-middle technique and consider two
smaller systems. This has the potential to reduce the complexity of the attack.
One should also note that in practice the attacker is not primarily interested
in the full solution of the system, but rather in the key variables. In fact, in a
“partial key recovery” attack, only few key variables might suffice.
Therefore, it is possible that one may be able to use a combination of crypt-
analytic and algebraic techniques (including Linearisation and Gro¨bner Bases)
to mount a successful attack without actually computing the solution of the
entire system.
7.1 The Polynomial Ideal Generated by the BES System.
Let S be the system of multivariate quadratic equations derived from the BES
encryption operation, and K a fixed encryption key. A closer look at the prop-
erties of the ideal generated by these polynomials may prove to be useful when
attempting to solve the system.
For every plaintext/ciphertext pair (P,C), we have a particular system S(P,C)
and an ideal 1
I(P,C) = 〈S(P,C)〉 ⊆ K[xi,(j,m), . . . , wi,(j,m), . . . , ki,(j,m)].
In fact we are mostly interested in the ideal
IK(P,C) = I(P,C) ∩K[k0, k1, . . . , k15]
where k0, k1, . . . , k15 are the first key variables (i.e. the original key).






where (P,C) run through all plaintext/ciphertext pairs.
Given a key K, a random plaintext block P , and C such that EK(P ) = C,
the probability that there exists another key K ′ with EK′(P ) = C is approx-
imately (1 − 1/(e − 1)) ∼= 42%. Therefore we expect that in many cases, for
a given plaintext/ciphertext pair (P,C), the K-dimension of the residue class
ring K[k0, k1, . . . , k15]/I
K
(P,C) is greater than 1 (i.e., the corresponding reduced
Gro¨bner basis should contain polynomials with degree greater than 1).
On the other hand, the K-dimension of K[k0, k1, . . . , k15]/IK is almost cer-
tainly 1. In other words, we expect IK to be of the form
IK =< k0 − κ0, k1 − κ1, . . . , k15 − κ15 >
1 To avoid inconsistent systems, we will make sure to describe the system in such way
that it does not include “0-inversions” (i.e. use the map x 7→ x254 when necessary).
with κi ∈ K. If this is not true, then there are at least two keys K1 and K2 such
that
EK1(P ) = EK2(P )
for every plaintext block P , and K1 and K2 induce the same permutation on the
set of possible plaintext blocks, which would not appear to be the case for the
AES.
8 Alternative Approaches
It is clear that an efficient method for solving the polynomial systems considered
so far would represent a successful key-recovery attack against the AES. However,
even when the system cannot be solved, other approaches could well be used in
order to mount less ambitious attacks against the cipher. One could examine
common applications of the AES, such as AES-based hash function and MAC
constructions, modes of operation, relation between plaintexts, etc.
At the very least, a cryptanalyst would like to find a polynomial-time dis-
tinguisher between the cipher and a random permutation. This could be used
either to mount a practical attack or simply to show some structural weakness
of the cipher.
Given the rich algebraic structure of the cipher, it is not inconceivable that an
“algebraic” distinguisher exists. This would most likely exploit the byte-oriented
structure of the cipher and the typical round version of the BES, which consists
of inversion, matrix multiplication and key addition over F28 :
b 7→MB .b
−1 + (kB)i
Mathematically, this seems to be the most natural representation of the cipher.
Both the S-Box (inversion on F28) and the linear layer are highly structured,
and this could well be exploited in the analysis of the cipher.
9 Conclusion
Rijndael is a cipher with a simple, elegant and highly algebraic structure. Its
selection as the AES has led to a growing interest in the study of algebraic
properties of block ciphers, with a particular focus on algebraic techniques that
can be used in their cryptanalysis. One promising approach is to exploit the large,
though surprisingly simple, system of multivariate quadratic equations derived
from the cipher. An efficient method for solving this system would represent a
successful key-recovery attack against the AES. While the problem of solving
such systems is known to be hard, it is not entirely unlikely that a technique can
be developed which exploits the particular algebraic structure of these particular
systems.
Furthermore, it is also possible that the AES algebraic structure could be
exploited on mounting less ambitious attacks. The AES has a rich algebraic
structure, and while many of these properties might not prove to be relevant
in the cryptanalysis, it is not inconceivable that one could find a novel way to
explore this structure in the analysis of the cipher.
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